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Introduction
The Oil and Gas industry is regarded to be laden with 
environmental risks [1]. Similarly, the Nigerian oil and 
gas sector has been adduced to have brought about several 
challenges to the Nigerian environment and the public health 
of its inhabitants [2]. These challenges include, water pollution 
from oil wastes which negatively impacts the hygienic capacity 
of such waters to man, as well as the natural habitat it serves to 
aquatic life, [3] and land pollution from oil wastes which affect 
the agricultural function ability of such lands [4]. It is the view 
of certain scholars that these spills have either been a result of 
the negligence of oil operators in the Niger Delta region, [5] or 
a consequence of the act of oil sabotage by oil vandalisers [6].
It also includes gas flaring as a form of air pollution [7]. Gas 
flaring has been defined as the burning of natural gas, which 
could have otherwise, been refined into usable products [8]. 
This pollution source has been asserted to cause health risk such 
as asthma, bronchitis, skin problems, breathing problems [9]. 
Wisner and Cannor posited that the process of flaring creates 
a physical raging fire at gas flaring sites, with thick smokes 
billowing into the atmosphere and falling back as acid rain, 
thus polluting the rivers and creeks within the region [10]. 
This position was supported by Uyigue and Agho [11], who 
posited that the concentration of acid rain seems higher in the 
Niger Delta than surrounding regions. Scholars have further 
maintained that the heat from the gas flaring in the region has 
killed several of the regions vegetation, destroyed the mangrove 
swamps and salt marshes, and inhibited growth of plants [12].
Indeed, this paper does not seek to discuss the challenges of oil and 
gas pollution in Nigeria, nor does it seek to discuss the attendant 
effects of the pollution. This is based on the premise that there has 
been several discourse on this subject. The paper does not also 
seek to discuss the position of extant Nigerian laws on oil and gas 
pollution. This is based on the premise that the PIB (in its current 
form), under Section 354 provides itself to, upon passage, repeal all 
existing laws relating to oil and gas in Nigeria [13]. 
Hence, this paper posits that in replacing extant legislations on 
oil and gas regulation, there is some measure of expectation 
as to the ability of the PIB to resolve the inherent oil and gas 
pollution as that is also part of the regulatory measures implored 
in these legislations. The paper shall illustrate some inherent 
deficiencies within the Bill (as it currently is) by discussing a 
few of its provisions that seems to make it unable to solve the 
oil and gas pollution debacle in Nigeria. 
Deficiencies of the Petroleum Industries Bill
Some of the existing legislations regulating Nigeria’s oil and 
gas sector include: the Oil Pipelines Act [14], the Petroleum 
Act [15], the Associated Gas Reinjection Act [16], the 
Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions, Etc.) Act [17], 
the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency Act 
[18], the Oil in Navigable Waters Act [19], the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Act-EIA Act [20], the National 
Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement 
Agency (Establishment) Act-NESREA [21], and the Petroleum 
Production and Distribution Anti Sabotage Act [22]. 
In line with the provision of the PIB to repeal all extant laws 
regarding oil and gas in Nigeria, it is expected that the former 
should seek to further environmental management in the oil and 
gas sector. This it can do by providing solutions to the current 
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environmental challenges associated with Nigeria’s oil and gas 
industry that existing legislations might have been unable to 
remedy. Scholars have pointed out some deficiencies that might 
have inhibited the ability of these legislations to effectively 
solve the environmental menace of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector 
as including: lack of clarity on core terms within the Acts to 
convey the message of the Act, very weak sanctions that are 
not commensurate with the extent of pollution they have been 
provided against, inability of the Acts to sanction a failure of the 
agencies they create (as laws) to perform the very purpose for 
which their individual Acts has created them; hence an inability 
of the Acts to provide true enforcement of their purpose, etc. 
[23]. It therefore means the PIB under normal circumstances 
ought to address these inadequacies in its structure towards 
solving Nigeria’s oil and gas pollution. The paper shall therefore 
examine how it has fared in this regard. 
The PIB seeks to “provide for the establishment of a legal, 
fiscal and regulatory framework for the Petroleum Industry in 
Nigeria and for other related matters.” This implies that the Bill 
covers all matters relative to oil and gas in Nigeria including 
environmental matters that relate to both spheres. Subject to 
Section 6(1), “The Federal Government shall, to the extent 
practicable, honour international environmental obligations 
and shall promote energy efficiency, the provision of reliable 
energy, and a taxation policy that encourages fuel efficiency by 
producers and consumers.” 
The clause “….to the extent practicable,” as in Section 6(1) 
of the Bill, above, restates the provisions in the NESREA 
Act as pertain to international environmental treaties and 
obligations on oil and gas matters, only shifting responsibility 
on such international obligations from NESREA to the federal 
government. However, by employing the caveat “…..to the 
extent practicable” the provision suddenly reduces the certainty 
and introduces some elasticity with regard to the extent to 
which the federal government can honour such international 
treaties. This is because such caveat creates some form of 
escape to the federal government from actually committing to 
the international environmental obligations not only merely in 
form, but in substance. 
Section 283 of the Bill, provides that “Every licensee or lessee 
engaged in petroleum operations shall, within three months 
of the commencement of this Act, submit an environmental 
programme or an environmental quality management plan…”  
Similarly, 285(1) of the Bill provides thus: “Prior to the approval 
of the environmental management plan or environmental 
management programme by the Minister, every licensee 
or lessee shall pay the prescribed financial provision to the 
Inspectorate in accordance with guidelines as may be issued 
by the Inspectorate from time to time, for the rehabilitation or 
management of negative environmental impacts, as a condition 
for the grant of the said licence or lease.”
Indeed, the provisions of Section 283 of the Bill cover a tender 
of EIA in the form of quality management plans. However, this 
Bill fails to provide any penalty whatsoever against a potential 
offender who fails to tender this plan. This implies that if in 
essence, the Bill is passed into law, there would be no real 
criminal penalty sanctioning environmental matters in the oil 
and gas sector in Nigeria. 
Similarly, in providing that the licensee shall make some 
payments from the outset towards the remediation or 
management of environmental damage, Section 285 (1) of the 
Bill seems to anticipate environmental harm even before the 
actual occurrence (Considering the fact that the Bill makes no 
actual provision for the particular amount that shall be so set 
aside for this purpose but leaves it to the inspectorate, nor does 
the bill provide any form of penalty for a criminal breach of 
the licensee to tender an environmental quality management 
plan (EQMP)), this gaping huge loophole might naturally make 
a licensee chose to pay the prescribed financial provision set 
aside, refuse to tender any form of EQMP, and yet commit 
pollution crimes. At any rate, should the licensee pay this 
anticipatory environmental remediation fee now, even before 
commencement of operations, if and when environmental issues 
such as oil spill occur in the future, who would be responsible 
for clean-up and environmental restoration? Meanwhile, who 
benefits from the money being paid now, the government and/
or its agents, the regulatory authorities, or the future, as-yet-
unknown victim(s)?
Furthermore, Section 293(1) of the Bill provides that “any person 
engaged in activities requiring a licence, lease or permit in the 
upstream and downstream sectors of the petroleum industry 
shall manage all environmental impacts in accordance with the 
licensee or lessee’s approved environmental management plan 
or programme. It shall be the responsibility of every licensee 
or lessee as far as reasonably practicable to rehabilitate the 
environment affected by exploration and production activities 
whenever environmental impacts occur as a result of the licensee 
or lessee’s operations.”
However, Section 293(2) of the Bill, exempts the licensee or 
lessee from liabilities for the rehabilitation of the environment 
where the act adversely affecting the environment has occurred 
as a result of sabotage of petroleum facilities which includes 
tampering with the integrity of any petroleum pipeline and 
storage systems. It went further to provide that any dispute as to 
the cause of an act that has adversely affected the environment 
shall be referred to the Downstream Regulatory Agency (which 
it refers to as the Agency) by the licensee, lessee or any affected 
person for determination, and that such determination by the 
Agency shall be final. Even more, Section 293(4) of the Bill 
expressly provides that “where the determination is that the act 
adversely affecting the environment has occurred as a result of 
sabotage, the costs of restoration and remediation shall be borne 
by the local government council and the state governments 
within which the act of sabotage occurred.”
This study is of the position that the attribution of vicarious 
liability to states and local government councils within which 
any act of sabotage adversely affecting the environment has 
occurred is grossly unjustifiable. Firstly, this is because a 
determination by the Agency of any such dispute under Section 
293(2) of the Bill seems to be a derogation of an exercise of 
powers that should be clearly judicial in nature. It is therefore 
doubtful whether the Agency (which is not a court or tribunal 
established by law and vested with judicial power) is competent 
Chuks-Ezike
Environ Risk Assess Remediat 2018 Volume 2 Issue 237
to make such determination in any dispute arising between a 
licensee/lessee on the one hand and a local government council 
or state on the other. 
It is an undisputable principle of constitutional law that such 
judicial powers of adjudication can only be exercised by 
competent judicial courts or tribunals established under the 
law with legal powers and capacity to adjudicate rather than an 
Agency as the PIB proposes. This point has been well enunciated 
by Nwabueze who defined the concept of independence of the 
judiciary as implying [24]:
“First, that the powers exercised by the courts in the adjudication 
of disputes is independent of legislative and executive powers, 
so as to make it usurpation to attempt to exercise it either directly 
by legislation, as by a Bill of Attainder, or by vesting any part 
of it in a body which is not a court; secondly, that the personnel 
of the court are independent of the legislature and the executive 
as regards their appointment, removal and other conditions of 
service.” 
Similarly, in Kayili v Yilbuk [25], the Supreme Court held that 
“section 3(2) of the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law 
of Northern Nigeria 1963 which provided that in the case of 
any dispute, the Governor, after due inquiry and consultation 
with the persons concerned in the selection, shall be the sole 
judge as to whether any appointment of a Chief has been made 
in accordance with native law and custom was null and void 
because the provision purported to oust the unlimited jurisdiction 
of the State High Court and conferred same on the Governor.” 
Secondly, relying on the ruling on the SPDC/Bodo case [26], 
it can be presumed that the licensee or lessee has a general 
shielding and caring obligation towards the host community to 
protect it against avoidable harm arising from its operations. An 
established common law rule is that “the one who carries out 
hazardous activity on land is responsible for failing to anticipate 
and minimise the damaging effect of all trespassers, even those 
who are ill-intentioned. If a facility is not adequately secured 
against such trespassers, then the owner or operator of that 
facility can, be at least partly responsible for the damage done 
to third parties by, for example, thieves or others who have 
malicious intent” [27]. 
Interestingly, the provisions of Section 293(4) of the Bill does 
not only seem to go against this case law, but also seems to 
contradict the provisions under Section 4. 1 of the extant 
Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum 
Industry in Nigeria which states thus: 
“An operator shall be responsible for the containment and recovery 
of any spill discovered within its operational area, whether or not its 
source is known. The operator shall take prompt and adequate steps 
to contain, remove and dispose of the spill.” 
It is notable that even in tort, “the party that has the greatest 
control over the risks, and can reduce them most effectively 
should be assigned liability” [28]. This is because, “imposing 
liability on parties who are in the best position to mitigate 
risks provides incentives to do so.” Hence, considering the fact 
that one of such prominent operators in Nigeria, such as Shell 
ranks top ten on the Fortune 500 [29], it is only a reasonable 
expectation that in a case of satisfaction of liability between 
them and the host community, the former would rather be in the 
best position to mitigate the risks of sabotage. Thus, a defence 
of sabotage does not provide an automatic shield to them as the 
operator or owner of the facility unless it is established that all 
reasonable diligence has been exercised to secure and supervise 
the facility against interference by third parties. 
Interestingly, relying on the rationale for a vicarious liability 
relationship to exist being that there has to be a special 
relationship between the parties, there seems to be no grounds 
set out under the Bill on identifying the special relationship 
between any oil-producing host state/ local government council 
and the perceived third parties saboteurs within the boundaries 
of the said states and local government councils. Hence, there 
seems to actually be no justifiable grounds to impose a vicarious 
liability on the faceless third party. 
Indeed, until identified that any such relationship exists between 
oil-producing host states/ local government councils and vandals 
of petroleum facilities and installations, and a clear grounds of 
such identification is shown, it is the submission of this study 
that it is unjustifiable to place any liability on oil-producing host 
states/ local government councils. Thus, in Gilbert Okoroma & 
Ors v Nigerian Agip Oil Co., Ltd. [30], Manuel J, dismissing the 
defence of sabotage raised by the defendant, held that:
“The act of a third party is a good defence . . . but evidence must 
be led either to identify such third party or show circumstances to 
lead to an irresistible conclusion of the act of third party whose 
act was neither unforeseeable nor controllable by the defendant.” 
Even more, Section 116 of the Bill proposes the establishment 
of the Petroleum Host Communities Fund (PHC Fund) towards 
developing the economic and social infrastructure of the 
communities within the petroleum producing area in accordance 
with Section 117 thereof. In order to give effect to Section 117, 
Section 118(1) of the Bill provides that upstream petroleum 
producing company shall remit on a monthly basis ten per cent 
of its net profit into the PHC Fund. Section 118(1) (a) and (b) of 
the Bill nominates the beneficiaries of the PHC Fund to be the 
host communities within the petroleum producing areas and the 
petroleum producing littoral states. 
Curiously, Section 118 (5) of the Bill creates a loophole which 
can be exploited as ostensibly legitimate ground for a depletion 
of the Fund to the detriment of host communities; by providing 
that in the event of that vandalism, sabotage or other civil unrest 
occurs that causes damage to any petroleum facilities within a 
host community, the cost of repair of such facilities shall be paid 
from the Fund unless it is established that no member of the 
community was responsible for the damage. It therefore, might 
not be so wrong to surmise that the placement of the burden 
of proof of innocence on the host community might defeat the 
purpose of the PHC Fund, as failure by the host community to 
discharge the burden of proof in any given case implies that 
the PHC Fund that has accrued in their favour of the host 
community will be applied to off-set the cost of repairs to the 
damaged facilities and installations. In this way, the Petroleum 
Host Communities’ Fund could be drained for purposes other 
than that for which it is primarily proposed. 
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By stating; “………the cost of repair of such facility shall be 
paid from the PHC Fund entitlement unless it is established that 
no member of the community is responsible” Section 118(5) of 
the Bill seems to place the burden of proving that no member 
of the host community was involved or responsible for the act 
of vandalism or sabotage that caused damage to petroleum 
facilities within the host community, on the host community. 
It therefore, might not be so wrong to surmise that placement 
of the burden of proof of innocence on the host community 
might defeat the purpose of the PHC Fund, as failure by the host 
community to discharge the burden of proof in any given case 
implies that the PHC Fund that has accrued in their favour will 
be applied to off-set the cost of repairs to the damaged facilities 
and installations. In this way, the Petroleum Host Communities’ 
Fund could be drained for purposes other than that for which it 
is primarily proposed. 
It is provided in the Preamble to the Bill, which it seeks to 
address environmental concern in the petroleum, and possibly, 
gas sector [31]. Upon passage, the bill shall repeal all existing 
legislation governing oil and gas in Nigeria. Beyond repealing 
existing or previous legislations, such Bill, expectedly, 
should address most of the perceived structural, political, and 
administrative weaknesses that had bedevilled its predecessors. 
Interestingly however, two scholars have contributively pointed 
out that the Bill does little or nothing in depleting the actual 
structure and content of the existing environmental laws in the 
oil and gas sector but rather offers mere copious repetitions 
of the existing respective legislations it was made to repeal 
[32]. These scholars have even asserted that the Bill rather 
than address those concerns, seems to offer fewer solutions in 
terms of securing the desired environmental protection than the 
respective legislations it is being made to repeal. 
An example where the Bill has merely reflected the structure of 
an existing environmental Act without necessarily making any 
addition is reflected in Section 198(2) that, “a licensee or lessee 
who causes damage or injury to a tree or object of commercial 
value or which is the object of veneration shall pay fair and 
adequate compensation to the persons or communities directly 
affected by the damage or injury.” This provision is laudable in 
the sense that it guarantees some form of compensation from the 
offender who disturbs the surface including uprooting economic 
trees and moving communal groves and shrines. 
However, its provision seems almost same as Section 2(3) of 
the Petroleum Act which provide for the lessee or licensee to 
pay “fair and adequate compensation for the disturbance of 
surface or other rights to any person who owns or is in lawful 
occupation of the licensed or leased land.” In any case, the Bill, 
just like the Petroleum Act fails to explicitly define or interpret 
what it deems to be ‘fair and adequate’ nor does it explicitly 
explain who determines what actually is fair and adequate 
compensation in this regards. Indeed a comparison of the above 
provision of Section 198(2) of the Bill with Section 2(3) of the 
Petroleum Act shows a clear repetition of structure and intent, 
together with the apparent limitations contained in both. 
Similarly, Section 200 of the Bill provides that “every licensee 
or lessee engaged in upstream petroleum operations shall 
within one year of the commencement of this Act, or within 3 
months after having been granted the license or lease, submit 
an environmental management plan to the inspectorate for 
approval.” While this provision is laudable, the Bill provides no 
mechanism for actually inspecting the said plan that has been 
submitted to ensure that it is accurate nor does it provide any 
pathway for affected communities to make input and voice their 
concerns, especially where they happen to be aggrieved. 
It has been noted above that the Bill fails to provide any specific 
penal sanction against environmental offences in Nigeria. It has 
also been discussed that instead of making any real addition 
to existing environmental laws, the Bill rather seems to have 
repeated what has already been provided or even weaken the 
core element in what is available in the existing laws. 
An example where the Bill has rather reduced what is available 
in existing legislation is its proposed alteration to the extant 
legislation on gas flaring. Indeed extant gas flaring legislation 
names a price to flaring (albeit insufficient) with a view to 
eventually ending gas flaring. However Section 201 of the 
current Bill merely lamely provides that “the lessee shall pay 
such gas flaring penalties as the minister may determine from 
time to time.” Similarly, Section 277 of the Bill confers rights 
on the minister to permit flaring in circumstances whereby he 
feels utilisation is not feasible. 
A combination of the provisions of Sections 201 and 277 of the 
Bill indicates that the Bill not only fails to explicitly mention any 
known penalty to sanction gas flaring rather than a discretionary 
choice of the minister to stipulate payments from ‘time to time’, 
but also hands over the power to make such a colossal decision 
to a minister (a politician). This sweeping authority to one 
person who is not a judicial officer is dangerous for obvious 
reasons.
This further implies that the Bill only reflects the same position 
of the Associated Gas Injection Act without making any real 
improvements. It even worsens the current legislative provisions 
on flaring as instead of providing any tangible penalty against 
flaring, it provides a vague sanctioning reliant on the discretion 
of the petrol minister. Furthermore, unlike the previous gas 
flaring Acts that specifically set deadlines (that might not have 
been met) to gas flaring, Section 275 of the PIB sets no deadline 
but also confers a decision on the end date for flaring on the 
petrol minister.
Even more, the Bill fails to make any direct reference to the 
menace of oil sabotage that has been adduced to be a huge cause 
of Nigeria’s oil pipeline spill; nor does it provide any sanction 
against the crime.
On 25TH May, 2017, the Nigerian Senate passed the first tranche 
of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), titled the Petroleum 
Industry Governance Bill-PIGB [33] at a Senate plenary 
session although this is yet to be concurred to by the House of 
Representative- the 2nd (and lower) Chamber of the Nigerian 
legislature [34]. What was passed so far is only a portion of 
the original Bill and indeed contains just a very few parts of it. 
Interestingly, the PIGB does not make any additions to the PIB 
but rather only repeals or retains some of its sections. Virtually 
every section of the PIB that relates to environmental issues 
was retained. This is except for the provision of Petroleum 
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Host Communities Fund that was reflected in the PIB and was 
repealed in the PIGB. It is therefore clear that the PIGB has 
provided no extra details as to environmental matters besides 
what existed in the mother document (PIB). 
Conclusion
It is the position of this study, that besides the fact that this 
bill provides no seeming strict criminal penalty sanctioning 
oil pollution, nor does it provide any sanctioning against gas 
flaring besides a reference on and provides no certainty as to the 
legal obligation imposed on the Federal government to abide 
by international treaties for the protection of the environment, 
it also seems to be in favour of oil operators as it provides clear 
escape route from some liabilities that might have deterred 
the extent of criminal pollution they cause in the Niger Delta. 
It is therefore, almost clear that though the oil and gas sector 
presents the worst spate of criminal pollution in the country, 
the PIB which ordinarily should have become a standard of 
environmental protection and punishment of criminal pollution 
within the country, provides no real solution to this challenge. 
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